One of the perennial questions in computer ethics and analyses of virtual reality is: What is the difference between virtual and real-world objects and events. This question is especially important when trying to apply our real life moral norms to cyberspace; when engaging in dialectical reasoning (also known as casuistry). Aristotle defined reasoning as dialectical “if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted” ¹ , i.e. when we start out with paradigmatic cases upon which most of us agree (e.g. stealing is wrong) and analyse whether or not this consensus can be extended so as to cover similar actions (e.g. arguing that downloading intellectual property online is tantamount to stealing, hence wrong). Thus, analyzing the difference between the real and the virtual is not merely a theoretical question, but one that has profound implications for normativity.

Dialectical reasoning is not a one-way analysis, however. In this paper I will examine how our experiences in virtual reality are shaped by real life judgements, and how virtual experiences in turn can shape our real life judgements. The purpose is to gain a better understanding of how virtual experiences can change the way in which we normatively evaluate real life events, and vice versa. For reasons I will return to, I have chosen to focus on Massively Multiplayer Online games (MMOs) and the controversial case of ‘virtual rape’ in order to shed light on this issue.

Dialectical reasoning and computer ethics

Dialectical reasoning is a distinguishing characteristic of much work in computer ethics. This is reflected in James Moor’s famous definition of computer ethics as the study of policy vacuums that occur in the wake of computer technology. ² Policy vacuums often occur because it is unclear whether our real-life concepts, such as ‘stealing’, retain the same meaning when we are talking about computer-mediated actions. As an illustration of dialectical reasoning in computer ethics, it has been argued that stealing a digital object (e.g. illegally downloading MP3 files) is morally equivalent to stealing a physical object (e.g. stealing a CD from a record store). This kind of dialectical reasoning rests upon what is known as the principle of formal equality, which can be formulated as follows: Cases that are relevantly similar should be treated (or judged) in a similar manner; a differential treatment requires a relevant difference. This entails that our moral judgements in the real world can be extended to the virtual world only if we are able to show that the difference between the two are not ethically relevant. For instance, it can be argued that downloading an MP3 file and stealing a physical CD is morally equivalent since both actions entail acquiring someone else’s property against their consent. But at the same time, it can be argued that stealing a CD entails depriving the rightful owner of his property, whereas downloading an MP3 does not. As can be seen in this example, dialectical reasoning and the principle of formal equality does not always provide us with answers, but at the very least, constitutes a platform for inquiries into the ethically relevant differences between the real and the virtual.

1 Aristotle, Topics, Book 1, part 1

2 Moor, J. H. (1985). “What Is Computer Ethics?” in Bynum, T. W., ed. (1985), Computers and Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell.

The reason why I focus on MMOs is that, although computer-mediated, our actions in MMOs influence other human beings. They pass through the digital representations and affect the person where it is real. Hence the ethical questions are not restricted to how our actions in virtual worlds affect ourselves, but also how our computer-mediated actions in virtual worlds affect other moral persons. Yet, there are of course differences between real and virtual actions, and it is important to take these differences into account when evaluating our ethical obligations in virtual worlds. In MMOs we interact with other humans beings, and the main difference from real world interactions is that we are acting through and towards more or less designed representations of our selves (socalled avatars). Moreover, our interactions are distinctively verbal, in the sense that our actions do not directly influence the physical body of other beings. To invert the old proverb, in VR, sticks and stones may not break your bones, but words can hurt you. In some cases, this difference obviously entails that we cannot easily extend our moral convictions from the real to the virtual; real-world murder is completely different from virtual murder. In other cases, the difference is apparently not ethically relevant; a heinous insult in the real world is not completely different from a heinous insult in the virtual. The interesting, and challenging, questions arise with regard to moral judgements that only partially, but still to some degree, can be extended from the real to the virtual. Although highly controversial, one example of such a dilemma is the seemingly odd conception of “virtual rape”.

The influence of real life judgements upon virtual experiences

In a much-debated 1993 paper, Julian Dibbell describes what is commonly known as the first example of a virtual rape. ³ At first sight, the very concept of a virtual ‘rape’ seems ludicrous, perhaps even dangerous in that it undermines the seriousness of real-life rape. Dibbell describes his initial reaction to the phenomenon:

I was still the rankest of newbies then … still too unsteady to make the leaps of faith, logic, and empathy required to meet the spectacle on its own terms. I was fascinated by the concept of virtual rape, but I couldn't quite take it seriously. ⁴

But, when Dibbell describes the personas and the actions that happened in a virtual world called ‘lambdaMOO’ one night, it soon becomes clear that the differences and, albeit weak, similarities between a virtual and a real rape cuts to the very essence of what it is – and might become – to immerse oneself in virtual reality. The concept ‘virtual rape’ was not something that was coined to describe the events in hindsight, nor established beforehand. ⁵ What made it a virtual rape was simply that the victims experienced it as if it was a rape. There was no pre-established definition of what constitutes a virtual rape, but rather an attempt to find some real life concept that could give meaning to why the main victim s and the spectators found themselves baffled and overwhelmed by their own reactions (Dibbell 1993). Neither was the use of the concept ‘rape’ a result of one

3 “A Rape in Cyberspace – How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Data base Into a Society”, retrieved online, November 20, 2006, from http://www.villagevoice.com/specials/ 0543,50thdibbell,69273,31.html . Due to constraints on space, I will not go into details on how the virtual rape took place, but refer the interested reader to Dibbell’s work which explains it in both technical and metaphorical terms. Notice especially the importance of the ‘voodoo doll’ and how the “victims” were unable to protect themselves without thereby violating the rules, or the conditions of possibility, of the virtual world.

4 Dibbell later notes: “Where before I'd found it hard to take virtual rape seriously, I now was finding it difficult to remember how I could ever not have taken it seriously”.

5 In this sense, the virtual rape does not fit into Philip Brey’s Searle -inspired definition of an ’ontological representation of an institutional entity’ in which there is a consensus that X counts as Y (in context C). See Brey, P. (2003). ”The Social Ontology of Virtual Environments” in American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 62(1):269-282.

person’s over-reaction, since a near unanimous group of spectators found no better word to describe what happened. The main victim later described that “posttraumatic tears were streaming down her face – a real-life fact that should suffice to prove that the words' emotional content was no mere playacting” (Dibbell 1993).

The very real emotions that followed an event that could just as well have been interpreted as something completely different than a rape points to the very precondition for immersing   oneself in virtual reality. This immersion is indeed a leap of “faith, logic and empathy”, but that leap is also what facilitates virtual versions of real-life crimes. ⁶ Refusing to accept that the virtual crimes are comparable to the analogous real-life crimes, and thereby import real life judgements to explain virtual experiences, is a refusal of what makes MMOs virtually real. In more philosophical terms, one thereby steps out of the language game of the MMO. In this situation, the real life concept of ‘rape’ was imported into virtual reality in order to make sense out of a deeply hurtful and unexpected event, and the perpetrator was condemned as unanimously as one would condemn a real life perpetrator.

The influence of virtual experiences upon real life judgements

The difficult ethical problems do not stem merely from applying real life judgements to virtual experiences, however. More difficult questions arise when such an analogy threatens to change our real life judgements. There are a number of real life consequences, both good and bad, that might follow from judging a virtual event as a rape:

• If the notion of rape is applied to virtual experiences, this could weaken the perceived severity of real life rape (which might be the main reason why many of us feel uncomfortable with the very notion of virtual rape). In other words, the traumatic experience of a virtual rape can be profound, but ultimately rests upon a social construction, i.e. a willingness to accept the event as a rape. A similar judgement of the traumatic experiences following a real life rape is obviously problematic.
• Conversely, if the notion of rape is applied to virtual experiences, this can lead to an increased understanding of rape being not merely a violation of body but also a violation of mind. In other words, such an analogy emphasizes the psychotraumatic aspects of rape, hence strengthens the perceived severity of rape – in any form.
• Seeing that virtual experiences can have such a profound impact on someone as to be   characterized as rape might lead us to blur – and dramatically change our views on – the difference between freedom of speech and acts of violence.

It is not my intention in this paper to take a stand on how the notion of virtual rape actually changes our real life concepts, nor to argue that one of the three scenarios above are more or less likely. My argument, to be elaborated in the full paper, is merely that the dialectical movement between the real and the virtual can influence our normative evaluation in both worlds, and that an analysis thereof can help us understand not only how our real-life concepts influence our virtual experiences, but more importantly, how our virtual experiences might influence our real life concepts.

6 “The illusion of reality lies not in the machinery itself but in the user’s willingness to treat the manifestations of his or her imaginings as if they were real”, Reid, E. (1995), “Virtual worlds: Culture and imagination”, in Jones, S., Ed., CyberSociety: Computer-Mediated Communication and Community , Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.